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ABSTRACT
This research critically investigates the soteriological ground 
of John Hick’s religious typology and his understanding of 
Religious Pluralism. It begins by considering the criticsims 
of Gavin D’Costa who, in his early work, favored Hick’s 
typology in Theology and Religious Pluralism, but later 
became critical of it in his work, Impossibility of a Pluralist 
view of Religions. It will also consider Paul Knitter’s 
alternative fourfold typology introduced in his work, 
Introducing Theologies of Religions, and Mark Heim’s 
ideas concerning religious pluralism in his work Salvation.  
Finally, the paper will investigate Zen Buddhism’s view of 
a “positionless position” as a “non-common denominator” 
from Masao Abe’s Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue 
to see if Hick’s idea of ultimate reality is viable basis to 
defend religious pluralism.  After demonstrating these 
critiques of Hick’s main soteriological grounds of this 
threefold typology, the research defends a new framework 
of threefold typology, not built on soteriological grounds, 
but on teleological grounds, in order to fulfill Hick’s own 
wishes for promoting peace both spiritually and socially. 
This is a new framework which can embrace the beliefs of 
not only pluralists, but also exclusivists and inclusivists, 
and those who comprise the majority of Christians in the 
world today. 
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Introduction
As Masao Abe points out, Europe previously had enjoyed a 
religious monopoly of Christianity.1  However, with globalization there 
followed by an influx of immigrants from different faiths. With this 
influx, Christian theologians and ministers of both Europe and North 
America needed to reconsider their theology and philosophy of religion 
to minimize conflicts and to promote peaceful co-existence.  This trend 
has been a continuous process since the beginning of WWII.  In 1941, 
One of the leading writers connected to this change is John Hick. With 
the outbreak of World War II, Hick was very much against violence 
and he refused to take part in war. Instead, he joined the Friends’ (i.e. 
Quakers’) Ambulance Unit and served in several hospitals.2  Hick was 
then considered a Christian evangelist; he previously experienced a 
conversion during the age of eighteen when studying law degree at 
University College, Hull.3 His first published article in Scottish Journal of 
Theology in 19584 criticized D.M. Baillie’s understanding of Christology 
as departing from the Chalcedonian orthodoxy in a “paradox of grace.” 
This demonstrated his earlier conservativism, which is in contrast to the 
more radical understanding of Christology and rejection of Chalcedonian 
orthodoxy in his later works.  His conservative and exclusivist views 
evolved into a more pluralistic view after obtaining the position in the 
Theology Department of the University of Birmingham in 1967.  He 
witnessed the changes of that industrial city, with the influx of immigrants 
from the Caribbean islands and Indian subcontinent. This created larger 
communities of non-Christians: Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and Hindus 
along with the long-established Jewish community. He also witnessed 
the emergence of the neo-Nazi National Front, generating prejudice and 
hatred and promoting violence against these communities.5  
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Thus, his fifteen years in Birmingham6 and his involvement in 
community development shaped him as a Religious Pluralist until his death 
in 2012.  Hick was not only involved in various community relations’ 
organization, but he was also one of the founders and the first chair of the 
activist AFFOR (All Faiths for One Race) and encountered opportunities 
to visit the temples, mosques, synagogues and other places of worship.7 
Although Alan Race firstly introduced a tri-polar classification 
of Christian theology of religions in 1983, Hick elaborated his idea of 
Religious Pluralism by contrasting it to the other categories of Exclusivism 
and Inclusivism in an effort to solve the problem of conflicting truth-
claims among different religions and to find a common ground among 
different religions. This classification has come under criticism because 
of its contradictions and the failure to solve conflicting religious truth 
claims. The purpose of this paper will show that these problems with 
Hick’s typology can be traced to its soteriological ground. It will further 
go on to suggest that Hick’s typology still has value if it is reconsidered 
from a teleological ground. 
Tri-Polar Typology on Soteriological Grounds
When Hick explains the tri-polar typology, he usually describes 
Exclusivism and Inclusivism before presenting his Religious Pluralism; 
thus, previous two serve as thesis and antithesis for Hick’s Religious 
Pluralism as synthesis.  For this reason, D’Costa believes the typology 
functions only for a heuristic purpose and positions Religious Pluralism 
as the only true option.8 Nevertheless, we should examine if this threefold 
typology can still be useful heuristic purpose or not.  Firstly, however, we 
need to explain Hick’s position carefully.  D’Costa explains the threefold 
typology in short as follows. 
Although there are, without a doubt, considerable 
differences between theologians belonging to the same 
‘camp’ and many features of overlaps between different 
approaches, it can be in general briefly summarized. 
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Exclusivism asserts that only those who hear the gospel 
proclaimed and explicitly confess Christ are saved. 
Inclusivism claims that Christ is the normative revelation 
of God, although salvation is possible outside of the explicit 
Christian church, but this salvation is always from Christ.  
Pluralism insists that all religions are equal and valid paths 
to the one divine reality and Christ is one revelation among 
many equally important revelations.9  
Alan Race originally created the threefold typology, but John 
Hick developed this idea in his books to promote his version of Religious 
Pluralism.  For Hick, Exclusivism is out of question since traditional 
dogma, ‘no salvation outside of church (Extra ecclesiam nulla salus10)’ 
as previously taught in the Catholic tradition was already superseded by 
the Second Vatican Council in 1960’s.11  According to him, Exclusivists, 
who believe the supremacy of Christian God and deem other religions 
and their followers as false is no longer acceptable. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that before the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic church 
had been taking this ‘no salvation outside of church’ stance for more than 
a millennium.  In addition, as of today, many Protestant churches are 
holding this position as well. The Pentecostal church is a good example 
in modern secular countries as the sociologist Peter Berger pointed out.12 
Berger initially, predicted that the more secularization progresses, the 
less the number of religious members will be.  However, to his surprise, 
he found out the fact that the members of religious organizations did not 
diminished and that the numbers of the Pentecostal followers grew much 
faster pace than that of the conventional Protestant churches.13  In fact, the 
number of church members in traditional Churches in western countries 
drastically decreased while the numbers of unaffiliated people increased 
as a result.  In England, regular church attendance rate diminished from 50 
percent in 1851 to nine percent in 1997.14  Thus, before debating this issue 
philosophically, it is worth noticing this trend in mind as a background 
knowledge. The phenomena in modern secular societies after WWII in 
many western countries, are the movements toward polarization, either 
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an influx toward more Exclusivism types of group in Christian churches 
or a departure from conventional churches to become unaffiliated, be it 
agnostic or atheist. 
Inclusivists hold the view that salvation is possible for non-
Christians and is open for those who have not yet encountered Christ or 
have not yet believed in Christ. However, salvation always must come 
from and through Christ.  As Karl Rahner describes, other religious 
followers are ‘anonymous Christians.’  Paul Knitter explains Rahner’s 
view as follows:
If grace, or God’s loving presence, is part of our very natures 
(step1), and if this grace must always be embodied (step2), 
Rahner adds another essential Christian belief (step3) to 
his theology of religions that assures that this is a Christian 
theology; all grace is Christ’s grace.  With this final step in 
his case for God’s presence in the broader religious world, 
Rahner provides both further depth but also new limits…  
From his understanding of Jesus as the reason why God 
pours out divine love over all creation in the first place, 
Rahner drew a further conclusion: therefore, any Buddhist 
or Hindu or Aboriginal Australian who experiences the 
grace of God’s love in their religion is already connected 
with and oriented toward Jesus, because Jesus represents the 
ultimate goal of God’s gift of love and grace.  Further since 
the continuing presence and power of Jesus are found in 
the community that carries on his message through history, 
those people who are “graced” in and through their own 
religions are also oriented toward the Christian church.  
They are, in a sense, already Christians and experience 
what Christians experience and are directed toward what 
Christians have in Jesus.  But they don’t realize it yet.  
They’re Christians without the name of Christian.  They 
are anonymous Christians.15
Rahner believed that other religious followers who experience 
the grace of love are connected to Jesus Christ.  Nevertheless, Hick 
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is dissatisfied with this idea since Inclusivism still hold the view of 
supremacy of one’s own belief and religion over others.16  In other words, 
the grace of Christian religion is only unilateral and not bilateral; Hick 
considers it as a problematic issue since sincere dialogue requires a 
willingness to understand each other without considering other religions 
as inferior.  Most Inclusivists do not consider how they would feel if 
religious scholars from other faiths applied the same Inclusivism logic 
by claiming that all Christians are ‘anonymous Muslims,’ ‘anonymous 
Buddhists,’ or ‘anonymous Hinduists,’ therefore, there is salvation for 
Christians but not through Christ.  This idea is not easy to accept for 
Christian Inclusivists.  
Does not the Inclusivist believe that all claims to be the one 
and only true religions are false except for his own Christian 
claim.  Inter-religious dialogue, Catholic Inclusivists 
believe although they are too polite to say so face to face 
that they alone have the final and absolute truth, whilst 
their dialogue partners have only lesser elements of truth.17 
Hick is aware that the majority of Christians remain within the 
intellectual horizon of either exclusivism or inclusivism.18  Against this, 
Hick then explains his Religious Pluralism.
[R]eligious pluralism is a view that there is no one-and-only 
true and salvific faith.  Subject to the ‘fruits’ criterion, which 
rules out violent fanatical sects (including those within the 
world religions themselves), pluralism regards all the ‘great 
world faiths’ as equally authentic and salvific.  In the poetic 
words of the Persian Sufi, Rumi, ‘The lamps are different, 
but the Light is the same; it comes from Beyond.’19 
The sentence, “the lamps and the Light” is of course a metaphor; 
lamps signify different religions while the Light reaches everywhere and 
everyone in the world. Light is a kind of Ultimate Truth.  The number 
of lamps can be plural, however, the Light which provides the lamps’ 
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purpose is essentially the same.  This metaphor also points to an underlying 
soteriological ground to recognize the Light which is the true destination 
of all the various lamps.
 It is important to realize that when Hick mentions the threefold 
typology on soteriological grounds, the conflicting problem of truth-claims 
is always set in motion; Hick states that “that in fact the truth-claims and 
the salvation-claim cohere closely together and should be treated as a 
single package.”20
Hick’s Religious Pluralism in Depth
Moving beyond the metaphors concerning light, Hick’s Religious 
Pluralism employs Kantian Epistemology as a framework to present 
Ultimate Reality.  This Ultimate Reality is a noumenal reality, thing 
as it is in itself or Ding an sich21 in German.  According to Kant, when 
observing a thing existing as it is in itself, human beings comprehend 
only through sense perceptions of the object which are limited to capture 
all the information from the Ding an sich.  
Hick thinks this noumenal reality can be applicable to the noumenal 
deity which is coined as Ultimate Reality.  Phenomenal realties are deities 
to which human beings respond in various forms based on the regional 
human’s traditions and other factors, however it is also possible to think 
that we are in fact all responding to the same noumenal reality, which 
is ineffable.  Hick exhibits the same concepts from different religious 
traditions to show that his idea of Religious Pluralism is not so new 
and unique concept.  The examples are the distinction between nirguna 
Brahman and Ishvara from Hinduism, parallel distinction between the 
Godhead (Deitas) and God (Deus) from Christian mystic Meister Eckhart, 
Jewish Kabbalist mystic variation between En Soph, the absolute divine 
reality beyond all human description and the God of the Bible, and  Muslim 
Sufis, Al Haqq’s ‘the Real,’ seemingly similar concept to En Soph and the 
self-revealing Allah.22   He also points out the modern scholars share the 
similar views such as that Paul Tillich’s description of ‘the God above 
the God of theism’23 and that Gordon Kaufman’s contrast of ‘real God’ 
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and ‘available God.’24 25  
Although there are many so-called personal God, gods, or non-
personal gods, or non-theistic divinities, they are all one step before 
Ultimate Reality, and all the worships to different God, gods, non-theistic 
divinities can be thought as responses to the same Ultimate Reality, 
“a single divine noumenon and many diverse divine phenomena.”26 
Thus, it is logically plausible to acknowledge the particularities, such 
as religious teaching, language, ceremonial clothing, chanting among 
different religions as different forms to the same noumenal reality, which is 
beyond human descriptions and comprehensions.  This is Hick’s Religious 
Pluralism hypothesis.  Hick seems to find the common ground to resolve 
the issue of conflicting truth-claims for religions.  In the last paragraph 
of chapter nine in Philosophy of Religion, he ends as follows: “Thus it is 
possible, and indeed an attractive, hypothesis – as an alternative to total 
skepticism – that the great religious traditions of the world represent 
different human perceptions of and response to the same infinitive divine 
Reality.”27  For Hick, this noumenal reality is a synonym to a common 
denominator that exists beyond worldly phenomenological religions; thus, 
it has to be the only one common denominator which is indescribable 
and unexplainable. 
A Critical Analysis of Hick’s Tri-Polar Typology
D’Costa contests Hick’s explanation of Religious Pluralism as 
another form of Exclusivism. He points out that Hick holds the view that 
the ‘solus Christus’ assumption held by exclusivists is incompatible with 
the Christian teaching of God who desires to save all people.  According 
to D’Costa, Hick also insisted that it was God, and not Christianity or 
Christ, toward whom all religions move, and from whom they gain their 
salvific efficacy and he therefore proposed a theocentric revolution away 
from a Christ-centric or ecclesia-centric position that has dominated 
Christian history.28  Hick argued that the doctrine of second persona, the 
Son of God, should be understood mythically.  He stressed the doctrine 
of an all-loving God over that of the solus Christus principle and more or 
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less rejected the second persona of Trinity with the references to recent 
renowned New Testament scholars’ conclusions; this dogma that Jesus 
is the Son of God was created in 325 at Council of Nicaea by the Roman 
Emperor Constantine I, and this dogma created prevalent understanding 
among Christians that Jesus possess both human and God elements, 
solidified in 451 at Council of Chalcedon convened by Emperor Marcian 
and so forth.  In simple terms, D’Costa criticized Hick’s reductionism of 
Christianity.29  D’Costa, as a Catholic theologian, cannot tolerate Hick’s 
radical shift from Christ-centric to a theocentric position. 
The different religious responses to the same Ultimate Reality are 
seen as both theistic and non-theistic. D’Costa contests that Hick tries 
to overcome theistic essentialism.  This argument allows Christians to 
view the history of religions as a history of Ultimate Reality’s dynamic 
movement without making any special claims for Christianity.  According 
to D’Costa, Hick’s Christian attitude to other religions need not be 
characterized by a desire to convert, or claims to superiority, but a will 
to learn and grow together toward the truth; the mission should be jointly 
carried out to the secular world by the religions, rather than towards each 
other.  Hick suggests that Exclusivism and Inclusivism cannot provide 
such fruitful conditions for interreligious dialogues. D’Costa certainly 
has an enormous doubt about the threefold typology.  Before criticizing 
the typology, D’Costa admits that he had changed his views of it. “My 
own position has changed over the years.  Once a convinced Rahnerian, I 
now find myself both troubled by the threefold paradigm and theological 
construal of the problem.”30
   
The typology is constantly inadequate.  Furthermore, 
typologies easily harden into Procrustean31 be, forcing 
diverse materials into uncomfortably controlled locations.  
I think it is the case that in using the depictions (pluralism, 
inclusivism and exclusivism) we disguise the fact that 
what we are really dealing with are different forms of 
exclusivism… Pluralism often claims the high ground in 
being more tolerant, more liberal, more affirmative of truth 
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in other religions, etc.  The threefold typology rhetorically 
reaffirms this false self-description.  Pluralism, as I argue 
elsewhere, has its own intolerant, illiberal, exclusivist logic.  
It is a form of secular agnosticism, reducing all religion to 
private confession, controlling the public sphere with its 
own implicitly ideology.  In this sense, Hick’s pluralism 
is an exclusivist secular agnosticism, ruling out of court 
all truth-claims other than his own, allowing for the truth 
of only one “religion,” his own mythological modernity.  
Pluralism must operate with criteria to discern “truth,” 
“God,” and “salvation.”  And in so doing, it will naturally 
exclude all that is not in keeping with these criteria.  Hence, 
in this respect, it is no different from exclusivism.32
D’Costa revealed his first critical article called “The Impossibility 
of a Pluralistic View of Religions” in Religious Studies Vol. 32 June 
1996 and Hick responded the same journal Vol. 33 in June 1997 by the 
name of “The Possibility of Religious Pluralism; A Reply to D’Costa.” 
Hick rejected D’Costa’s claim that his Religious Pluralism was another 
form of Exclusivism merely because it employed criteria and considered 
anything that fell out of that criteria was wrong.  He admitted that he 
did employ criteria; but disagreed with D’Costa’s claim that all use of 
criteria constituted a form of Exclusivism was misleading33 and stressed 
that “Exclusivism and Religious Pluralism are of different logical kinds, 
the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith and the other a 
philosophical hypothesis.”34  
But if as Hick admitted there is a difference between religious 
affirmation and religious hypothesis, then is it also possible to consider 
that the typology itself be set on different grounds other than soteriological 
one?  This is the challenge of this paper.   Since the typology is deeply 
connected to the truth-claims and the condition of life after death, this 
typology could not separate from salvific grounds, but if Exclusivism 
and Religious Pluralism are on different grounds, this typology might be 
justified. D’Costa’s recognizes some of the limitations of the soteriological 
approach.
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Hick’s philosophical approach to religious pluralism could 
be contrasted with the very pragmatic approach taken by 
those deeply influenced by liberation theology, such as Paul 
Knitter or the Asian Roman Catholic theologian Aloysius 
Pieris.  Pieris emphasizes the overcoming of the theocentric, 
Christocentric, and ecclesiocentric problems that bedevil 
this debate by emphasizing the liberative sociopolitical 
power of religion as the only criterion for authenticity.  
For example, he finds that Buddhist monasticism and its 
commitment to the cessation of suffering through gnosis 
allows “an engagement in a positive and practical program 
of psychic-social restructuring of human existence here 
on earth in accordance with the path leading to nirvanic 
freedom.”35 
There are some who claim a fourth option such as Paul Knitter. 
Knitter explores more neutral categories.36  Instead of ‘Exclusivism,’ 
‘Inclusivism,’ ‘Religious Pluralism,’ he uses ‘The Replacement Model,’ 
‘The Fulfillment Model,’ and ‘The Mutuality Model’. This allows him 
to not categorize the first two as critically as Hick.  He then proposes a 
fourth option, ‘The Acceptance Model,’ which does not require a common 
denominator uniting the different religions; what Hick called Ultimate 
Reality. But regardless of his reaction to Hick, Knitter remains a monistic 
pluralist.  He uses the famous metaphor of finger is pointing to the moon 
in Without Buddha, I could not become a Christian.37  He believes that 
Buddhism and Christianity are pointing to the same Ultimate Reality. 
Mark Heim suggests that each religion should be acknowledged 
in its difference; unlike the pluralism of Hick, the pluralism of Heim is 
that there are many paths leading to diverse equally valid destinations. 
He writes, “Nirvana and communion with God are contradictory only 
if we assume that one or the other must be the sole fate for all human 
beings.”38  Thus, Heim criticizes Hick’s pluralism as not diverse enough. 
In other words, Heim’s pluralistic view is not a monistic pluralism, but a 
kind of pluralistic pluralism. It is for this reason that Heim calls himself 
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a ‘convinced Inclusivist’ who advocates ‘independent validity of other 
ways.’39      
There are two more scholars who are dissatisfied with Hick’s 
approach.  They are Kenneth Surin and John Milbank.  D’Costa thinks 
both are primarily dissatisfied with threefold typology itself.  Both see 
Hick as ignoring more important dimensions which underlie religious 
pluralism.
Surin’s criticism is essentially political and genealogical 
(deriving from Michel Foucault), suggesting that rather 
than serve up theologies about religious unity in an abstract, 
ahistorical, and apolitical fashion, real attention should 
be paid to the social, political, and power relationships 
between religions in their particular locality.  Theological 
talk has usually served to obscure rather than identify the 
real terrain in which the exercise of power in the materialist 
order operates.  Such materialist hermeneutics are the key 
to understanding the generation of various legitimating 
theologies – and pluralist theologies legitimate late 
modernity and capitalism.  While Surin’s criticisms are 
powerful and incisive, there is a danger that theology is 
reductively encoded by Surin’s materialism.40
His account of Milbank is similar but focused on praxis.
Milbank, while sharing much in common with Surin, 
proposes quite a different role for theology.  Milbank is 
deeply suspicious of the notion of “religion,” as well as the 
belief that dialogue provides a privileged access to truth.  
Rather, he urges that Christianity must simply proclaim 
its vision through its particular form of practice within the 
church.  The church can do no other than this, nor ought it 
to try.  What both Surin and Milbank do so clearly is alert us 
to the fact that all theology is a political and social practice.  
Milbank advances the case, in claiming a heavenly practice 
for Christians, a practice with a difference.41
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Departing for a moment from D’Costa’s view, it is beneficial to 
introduce a criticism of this typology from a non-Christian scholar, the 
Buddhist scholar Masao Abe.  He argues for his ‘positionless position’ 
by claiming that there are two types of pluralists; those who admit the 
commonality of religions and those who deny it (as mentioned in the 
fourth option).  The former includes Hick, while the latter suggests Heim 
and John Cobb Jr.  Abe first illustrates the Exclusivist’s view of rejecting 
a common denominator such as that of Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth.42 
Abe proposed another option; neither rejecting a common denominator 
nor accepting it.  It is neither monistic pluralism nor pluralistic pluralism. 
He introduces ‘no-common-denominator’ in the absolute sense which 
becomes a ‘positionless position.’43  In other words, from his perspective, 
Exclusivism, Inclusivism and Religious Pluralism no longer exists, by 
realizing the religious point referred to as ‘zero,’ the position of having an 
assumption of both that ‘the commonality exists’ or that ‘the commonality 
does not exist’ also vanishes; religious belief becomes a ‘positionless 
position.’  This idea undoubtedly stems from his Zen Buddhism and its 
emphasis on ‘non-self.’  However, precisely because of this, Abe argues 
that Hick cannot establish the idea of Ultimate Reality and simply place the 
non-theistic ‘Reality’ of Buddhism into this category of Ultimate Reality. 
After all, for Abe, even if Hick made such efforts to reduce the bar of 
Christ-centric theology to more pluralistic theocentric theology, Hick 
still holds a monistic point of view, that human beings are worshipping 
or responding toward an indescribable Ultimate Reality, which is still the 
one and only noumenal reality. 
 
Threefold Typology on Soteriological Grounds
According to D’Costa, Inclusivism has a similar logic to Religious 
Pluralism.  For instance, Rahner was happy to acknowledge God’s 
grace operative outside the visible boundaries of the church.  However, 
concerning the final destiny of men and women, Rahner could not depart 
from the necessity of the beatific vision, the Trinitarian glory of God.44 
Thus there is only a twofold typology according to D’Costa, or two forms 
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of Exclusivism, one which is inclusive, and one which is pluralistic. That 
is to say, either that salvation exists only with Christ or that salvation exists 
without Christ.  D’Costa detested Hick’s dismissal of Inclusivism and 
his view as a mere antithesis for a synthetic proposition of his Religious 
Pluralism.  Nevertheless, this is a somewhat unfair criticism of Hick and 
ignores Hick’s defense.45  For Hick, an Exclusivist refers to those who 
proclaim that salvation is achieved only by believing in Christ. 
Hick’s threefold typology has attracted much criticism, and yet the 
alternative typologies such as twofold and fourfold typology also have 
their problems.  In the field of Christology, it is certainly difficult to reach 
agreement.  Perry Schmidt-Leukel presents an insightful reaffirmation 
of Hick’s threefold typology by responding to six different categories of 
criticism to defend Hick’s tri-polar typology; however, Schmidt-Leukel’s 
idea still falters on the soteriological grounds.46  And this is a part of the 
problem, as long as the typology operates upon salvific grounds, defenses 
and criticisms of Exclusivism, Inclusivism and Religious Pluralism lead 
nowhere since there is little ability to compromise or alter their own 
religious affirmations.
We return to the same impasse as Hume. Conflicting truth-claims 
of religions cannot be solved since religion has its roots in particularity of 
belief.  Evaluating religious belief through the typology of Exclusivism, 
Inclusivism and Religious Pluralism leads to particularities that cannot 
be reconciled. This is fundamentally because this typology rests on 
soteriological grounds; whether salvation occurs only through Christ. 
This is why this typology has been so criticized and rejected. But the 
question is whether we can rescue Hick’s typology by shifting it away 
from its soteriological basis to a teleological one? 
Considering Hick’s Typology on Teleological Grounds 
We can thus propose the threefold typology with an emphasis on 
teleological grounds instead of soteriological grounds. In other word, we 
can give emphasis on what our faith leads us to become. As Hick himself 
argues, the way we evaluate the validity and truth of our religion(s), should 
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depend on the fruit of our spirituality which includes our morality.47 
Thus, the criterion of religious validity should be judged by the behavior 
of religious believers.  What we believe in is less important than how 
we act, although what we believe and how we act are connected. The 
authenticity of a religion cannot be measured on soteriological grounds 
but may be more accurately seen as a teleological problem. We need to 
reconsider the intentions of Hick for proposing his Religious Pluralism. 
That is to say that it aimed to overcome Hume’s skepticism about religions 
and to foster peaceful co-existence with people from different faiths. It is 
based on real living interaction. In this way, we can also see Exclusivists 
not as dangerous fundamentalists or even cults of which he gives many 
examples. We can see them based on how they act.  
Suppose that there are two Exclusivist missionaries sent to the 
developing countries where the poverty level is severe, from some 
traditional churches and not from cult groups.  Both of the missionaries 
firmly believed that without confessing Christ as our one and only savior, 
there is no salvation.  One Exclusivist missionary preaches about St. 
John’s gospel such as “Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and 
the life. No one comes to the Father except through me,’” (John14:6)48 
“Jesus said to him, ‘Have I been with you all this time, Philip, and you 
still do not know me? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father,’” (John 
14:9) and “I and the Father are one.” (John 10:30) This missionary’s 
interest was only to convert the local people, and if they did not accept 
Christianity, the missionary threatens them with damnation. On the other 
hand, we can consider the Exclusivist missionary who truly follows 
Jesus’s words from Matthew, “Truly I tell you, whatever you do to the 
least of my brothers and sisters, that you do unto me” (Matt. 24:40).  This 
missionary’s interest is to serve others, especially the poorest people on 
earth.  For such a person, Hick might probably agree that the fruit of 
Exclusivist missionary work is real or he would call the missionary a 
‘saint,’ even though the missionary is essentially an Exclusivist.  From 
teleological grounds, we can appreciate how people are transformed and 
grow spiritually by believing and encountering the divine nature.  Hick’s 
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typology runs into problems when seen from soteriological grounds, but 
by seeing it from teleological grounds, we can discover many ‘saints’ 
among ‘Exclusivists,’ and ‘Inclusivists.’ 
The departure from salvific grounds makes it possible to create 
acceptable categories in all categories. Exclusivists, Inclusivists, and 
Religious Pluralists all have bad and good, the inauthentic and the 
authentic. Exclusivists who practice good moral deeds should be accepted 
and praised, while extreme fundamentalists groups which promote 
violence against those of different faiths should be condemned.  Hick 
quoted the criterion of the authenticity of faiths from Bible.49  Hick said, 
“what St. Paul called the fruit of the spirit, which he described as ‘love, 
joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-
control’ (Gal. 5:22) to which we must, I think, add a commitment to social 
justice as an expression of love.”50  Authentic faith is directly linked to 
the manifestation of their belief and attitude towards day to day life and 
neighbors.  Each believer’s essence becomes actuality. If the essence of 
faith is ‘real,’ then its manifestation is also ‘real,’ which differs from mere 
moral grounds.  Each individual’s action in everyday life through the 
relationship with the divine should be considered carefully in this typology. 
If we are to be transformed from self-centric, ego-centric to divinity-
centric and act morally and with a compassionate attitude towards others, 
the faith must be good and true in terms of the criterion of Hick, which 
is applicable to all great world religions, not merely among Christians. 
Hick also acknowledged in his article that there are good and evil in all 
world religions.  Thus, the declaring position of Religious Pluralist on 
soteriological grounds alone is not sufficient even from Hick’s point of 
view, all in which there are no easy dwelling places to affirm oneself as 
righteous without fruitful actions and attitudes.  
Even more, Christians can move amongst those three categories 
without discriminating others or feeling superiority to others of different 
faiths.  Another thought experiment would be that a Christian nurse who 
is an Exclusivist encountering patients from different faiths, and treating 
them with compassion, not just because it is his or her job but because it 
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is his or her belief and mission. On soteriological grounds, one can fall 
into contradiction if one looks only at the beliefs, while on teleological 
grounds, these salvific elements are not a necessary condition to be an 
authentic spiritual being.  Most people can in fact be both Pluralist and 
Exclusivist without being self-contradictory just as Abe’s ‘positionless 
position.’  Unlike scholars who often adhere firmly to their position and 
rigorously debate these polemical issues, most people can grow their 
spirituality out of multiple stances.  Even among scholars, D’Costa has 
changed his position over the time; Hick himself was once Exclusivist 
too; Heim, who criticized Hick as not pluralistic enough, is a convinced 
Inclusivist.
Hick disliked the term ‘superiority,’ and detests the attitude 
among religious believers.  He was especially critical about Christian 
scholars who hold ‘superior’ view of their religion when having interfaith 
dialogues.  Hick did not make a clear distinction between ‘superiority’ 
on worship level and practical level.  But many ordinary Christians may 
consider their God ‘superiority’ without consciously feeling ‘superior’ 
to people of different faiths or considering other religions as ‘inferior’ to 
Christianity.  A sense of ‘superiority’ in faith is not the same as ‘superiority’ 
in the way we treat others.  The golden rule in all world religions is to treat 
others as you wish to be treated or do not do things to others that you do 
not like to receive.  As a result, the sense of ‘superiority’ of theocentric 
or Ultimate Reality consciousness manifests as a fruitful actuality out of 
their authentic spirituality.  Thus, there are two different paradigms; where 
people can freely proclaim the sense of superiority to divine natures as 
religious responses and regain their dynamism to transform through and 
in their faith to the divine, but people should not proclaim themselves as 
such to others who believe in different divinities.  In another paradigm, 
people can treat others from different faiths equally in multi-cultural 
communities without falling into self-contradiction and this attitude 
can be manifested through the response to the divine nature as a source 
of energy for spiritual growth, this dynamism should always serve for 
awaking people in order to act the criterion of ‘fruit’ and golden rules.  
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Conclusion
To defend Hick’s threefold typology on soteriological grounds 
is problematic. Hick presented his typology in ways which dismissed 
Exclusivism and Inclusivism as inferior and saw Religious Pluralism 
as the most advanced solution. However, in the real world, most people 
do not seem to want to abandon traditional religious dogmas so easily. 
But while we run into problems when we try to defend Hick’s typology 
on soteriological grounds, we can still find value in his work if we see 
it from teleological grounds. We need not only make distinctions based 
on belief but see it in terms of action.  Thus, it makes more sense to look 
at Hick who was interested in seeing human individual’s transformation 
in a global society as well as within local multi-ethnic communities. 
However, looking at Hick’s threefold typology from its transforming, 
self-developing and self-evolving angles, the threefold typology could 
be beneficial to lead Christians and those of other faiths to be more 
egalitarian, ethical, loving and compassionate.  As mentioned earlier, 
this reading from teleological grounds is not lacking in Hick’s writing. 
He often stresses in his writing teleological growth.  Towards the end of 
a public talk, Hick ended as follows.  
So the bottom line, I am suggesting, is this: we should live 
whole heartedly within our own faith, so long as we find 
it to be sustaining and a sphere of spiritual growth, but 
we should freely recognize the equal validity of the other 
great world faiths for their adherents, and we can also be 
enriched by some of their insights and spiritual practices.51
Can these Christians, Hick encourages to transform, live and 
act within their own faith, but also be regarded as admirable figures 
by other religious practitioners or even secular people?  If so, then the 
threefold typology on teleological grounds remains valuable device for 
understanding religion.
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